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JUDGM ENTS--RES JUDICATA-GENERAL DISMISSAL OF A
SUIT IN EQUITY UPON A DEMURRER SUSTAINED.-The ques-

tion to be discussed is: when there is a general dismissal of a suit in equity upon a demurrer sustained, is
that general dismissal res judicata of the subject matter of
the suit as between the same parties of their privies? The
general rule has long been recognized, by the West Virginia
Supreme Court, that a decree dismissing generally an
equity suit, without adding such words as "without prejudice to such other suit as the plaintiff might see proper to
institute", is conclusive, or res judicata.1 How far does
this general rule apply tothe situation where a bill is dismissed on demurrer sustained?
The earliest West Virginia case 2 on this point held:
"A decision upon a general demurrer to a bill, which
has clearly gone to the merits of the case, is an effectual
bar to further litigation; and where no formal defects
appear on the face of the bill the court will presume
that the demurrer has gone to the merits."
The former decree, which was pleaded in bar to this suit
in equity was a decree dismissing generally the bill after
the demurrer had been sustained, the plaintiff having failed
to amend. This appeared from the record of the former
suit which was before the court. The court in holding the
decree of dismissal res judicata reasoned this way:
"The demurrer was general, and as no formal defects
appear, the conclusion is irresistible that the court was
of the opinion that the facts averred in the bill did not
entitle the plaintiffs to relief and therefore it must have
dismissed the suit for the want of merit. This was necessarily an adjudication of the facts set out in the bill,
and a positive decision against the plaintiff on the merits" * * * * *. The plaintiffs certainly, when they filed
their bill, had a suit in court; and it is just as certain
that, after the final action of the court on their bill, they
had no such suit in court."
In a later case3 where a bill was dismissed upon a demurrer having been sustained, the court, in holding that it was
I Staley v. Railroad Co., 68 W. Va. 119,
48 W. Va. 630, 37 S. E. 552 (1900) ; Carberry
694 (1897).
Corruthers v. Sargent, 20 W. Va. 260
8 Carberry v. Railroad Co., 44 W. Va.260,

9 S. E. 946 (1907); Biuhirk v. Chafin.
v. Railroad Co., 44 W. Va. 260, P8 S. E.
(1882).
28 S. E. 694 (1897).
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error for the trial court not to add words of "without prejudice" to the decree of dismissal, said:
"A decree on full hearing dismissing a bill generally,
without reservation of right to the plaintiff to sue at law,
is conclusive upon all the matters involved in the case,
even though there was no jurisdiction in equity because
of adequate remedy at law. Unless it otherwise appear
from the decree it will be taken that the dismissal was
on a hearing of the merits."
Judge Brannon, in discussing the question, mentioned as an
instance where such a decree might not be a bar, the case
where it is patent that there is no jurisdiction in equity,
for instance, a bill in chancery upon a note. However, it
was suggested that even in such a patent case the defendant might not have raised the question of jurisdiction, or
the court might not have dismissed the bill for that reason.
The writer suggests that in such a patent case of no jurisdiction in equity, a contrary conclusion could be reached,
consistent with the rule announced in this case, on its facts.
Another case 4 is in accord saying that a general dismissal
of a bill in equity, because of adequate remedy at law, is
a bar to an action at law. The facts here, however, were
that in the former suit, which was held to be res judicata,
there was filed an answer along with the demurrer. Hence,
the holding of the court may be beside the point that is
being discussed here. To summarize, the cases just discussed seem to hold that where a bill in equity is dismissed
generally on a demurrer having been sustained, either
where there was a failure to amend the declaration, or
where there was no jurisdiction in equity because of adequate remedy at law, such a dismissal is res judicata.
On the other hand there are cases reaching a contrary
conclusion. The court, in a recent case, 5 said:
"The dismissal of a suit on demurrer, unless predicated
upon the merits, is not res judicata. No ground for
equitable jurisdiction having been stated in the former
suit, there is no presumption that its dismissal on demurrer to the bill went to the merits of the cause."
As early as 1885, just three years after the case of CorruthWatson v. Watson, 45 W. Va. 290, 31 S. E. 639 (1898).
* Brown v. Brown, 129 S. E. 469 (W. Va. 1925).
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ers v. Sargent,6 a case held that a general dismissal, was not
necessarily res judicata. There to a suit at law upon a
note there was pleaded the dismissal upon demurrer of an
equity bill to enforce -a lien upon a tract of land securing
the note, the demurrer having been sustained on the ground
that it appeared by the bill that the land had already been
sold, and that there had been a decree of the court affirming the sale, in which decree the claim of the plaintiffs to
have the note paid was ignored. The court held that the
dismissal on demurrer of the former suit was not res judicata, that it would not bar a suit at law upon the note. The
court based its decision upon the ground that it was not
clear by the decree of the former suit that the matter in
controversy here (whether the defendant is liable at law
on the note) was decided in that suit. Also it has been
held :8
"If the plaintiff fails on demurrer in his first action
from the omission of an essential allegation in his declaration, which is supplied in the second suit, the judgment
in the first suit is not a bar to the second."
And it has been held that where the bill was dismissed on
demurrer for defective pleading, (in a partition suit there
was no allegation that the plaintiff and the defendant were
cotenants), it does not bar an action at law. 9 Reaching
the same result but upon different reasoning is another
case.' 0 A bill in equity was held not to be barred by the
general dismissal of the former suit after the sustaining
of a demurrer which stated no grounds for the demurrer.
The court said that since the demurrer may have been sustained on the ground of lack of equity jurisdiction rather
than lack of right in the plaintiff, the decree not showing
upon which ground the demurrer was sustained, the decree,
therefore, was ambiguous. The court, concluding that the
ambiguity justified resort to the record in interpreting the
former decree, looked there and decided that presumptively the demurrer was sustained on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. The case would seem to hold that unless
it appears from the decree that the demurrer was sustained
0 N.

3, aupra.

" Poole v. Dilworth. 26 W. Va. 688 (1885).
s State v. McEldowney, 54 W. Va. 695, 700, 701, 47 S. E. 660 (1904).
10

Davis Colliery Co. v. Westfall, 78 W. Va. 785, 740, 90 S. E. 328 (1916).
Laing v. Price, '6 W. Va. 192, 83 S. E. 497 (1914).
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on the ground that it went to the right of the plaintiff, or
to the merits, then the decree is not res judicata.
What then is the law as laid down in the cases that have
been decided? It is certain that a dismissal upon demurrer
going to the merits is res judicataP Formerly the cases
held that where there was a general dismissal the court
would presume that the demurrer went to the merits.12 But
the late cases say that there is no presumption frbm a
general dismissal that the demurrer went to the merits;13
that if it is not clear that the demurrer went to the merits
the dismissal is not res judicata;14 and that if the demurrer
could have been sustained on any other ground than one
reaching the merits the decree is ambiguous and therefore
5 It would seem that unless it appears
not res judicata.1
from the record that the demurrer to the bill was sustained
on the ground that it went to the merits the dismissal of the
suit is not res judicata.
-- C. M. C.
1, Piekens v. Kniseley, 36 W. Va. 794, 15 S. E. 997 (1892); dictum in Davis
Colliery Co. v. WestfaUll. 9, supra.
2 N. 2 and 3, supra.
"aX. 5, aupra.
14 N. 7, supra.
u4ra.
2' N. 10,
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